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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 80's Spain experienced a remarkable reversal of 
inter-regional migration flows. The traditionally poor and net 
outmigration regions (Andalucia, Castilla-Le6n, Castilla La Mancha and 
Extremadura) became net immigration ones and the reverse happened for 
rich regions (like Catalulla, Comunidad Valenciana, Madrid and the Pais 
Vasco). The first signs of this change appeared in the first half of the 
decade (in Andalucia, Catalulla and the Pais Vasco) and were reported by 
Olano (1990). During the second half of the 80's the reversal was 
generalised. In Table 1 we report the regional migration flows from a 
representative sample of adult men in the labour force, covering the 
period 1987-1991. The percentage of outmigrants from Catalulla more than 
doubled the percentage of immigrants, while in Madrid it was almost ten 
times as big. In Andalucla, and particularly in Extremadura and Castilla 
La Mancha, the situation was the opposite. 
Indeed, what is important is not the aggregate decrease in inter­
regional mobility since the early 70's (which has remained stagnant) but 
the change in the pattern of inter-regional migration. What is it then that 
makes people stay in or move from regions in Spain at present? Why did 
people stop migrating from the poorest regions and, on the contrary, 
start to do so from the better-off ones? We think it is important to identify 
the factors behind individuals' migration decisions. Knowledge of these 
factors will be specially relevant for analysing the housing and labour 
markets in Spain. 
The purpose of this paper is to identify which regional economic 
factors influence the individual's migration decision, taking into account 
personal characteristics. We use individual data from the Migration 
Survey, included in the Spanish Labour Force Survey ("Encuesta de 
Poblaci6n Activa"), pooling independent cross-sections from 1987 to 1991. 
The availability of micro data will allow us to measure life-cycle and family 
factors that influence migration decisions. In doing this, we control for 
different individual propensities to migrate so as to be able to assess the 
genuine impact of regional economic factors (see Greenwood (1985». We 
expect that the rich cross-sectional variation available (individual and 
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regional) will allow us to disentangle regional effects from personal 
factors. Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) use a single cross-section to 
assess the effect of personal versus regional unemployment in the UK. We 
allow for the effect of regional variables to vary across people according 
to their personal characteristics, i. e. we allow the effects of regional 
variables to differ across subpopulations defined by personal 
characteristics. One contribution of the paper is to show that personal 
characteristics' not only have an important direct effect oh the migration 
decision, but that they also alter the effect on such decision of the 
regional economic variables and affect the interpretation of these regional 
effects. Many migration studies report a lack of significance of area 
economic variables (in particular unemployment) in explaining migration 
(Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989), Greenwood (1975, 1985». DaVanzo 
(1978) finds, for the US, that unemployment is relevant only for 
unemployed persons. We go a step further and consider a richer array of 
personal characteristics interacting with regional variables, and this 
proves to be the key to making sense of the regional unemployment rate 
effect. 
The paper is organised as follows . In Section II we describe our 
framework of analysis and the data. The results are presented and 
discussed in Section Ill. In Section IV we report some misspecification 
tests to check the robustness of the results . Section V states the 
conclusions. 
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II. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS AND DATA 
The purpose of this work is to study the factors that influence 
the individual's probability of migrating. The relevant migration 
literature has pointed Ollt the existence of push factors to move J those 
which influence mov�ment from the place of origin, as well as pull factors, 
those which influence movement to a particular place. Place-to-place type 
models of migration consider the conditions at source as well as those at 
destination. Here we do not consider a place-ta-place model because of 
insufficient information in our datal. Indeed, in our sample of 224,714 
individuals (obtained by pooling five years of the Migration Survey) there 
are only 664 inter-regional migrants. This would not be enough to identify 
the factors in a place-to-place model involving the 17 Spanish regions. We 
therefore focus on the regional push factors (as compared to the national 
average) that make people migrate (or prevent them from doing so), 
taking into account their different propensities to migrate according to 
personal characteristics. 
In terms of the standard human capital or random utility 
framework, potential migrants would evaluate the present discounted 
expected costs and returns of moving and staying. They will choose the 
option that produces the higher net expected return2• 
Let d; represent the expected difference between the utility of 
migrating and the utility of staying given observed regional and national 
economic variables (R1 J Rn> as well as other variables in the information 
set of individual i. We specify d; as follows 
i=l, . . .  , N  
where Xi denotes a vector of individual characteristics and �i is a 
disturbance term that includes unobserved variables. 
The individual will migrate if d; > 0, and the probability of this event 
conditional on Ri' Rn and X can be written as 
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Prob (d: > O) 
= 
Prob (Ilo' + 1l,,(R, -Ro) + Il" Ro + e, > O) 
= F (Ilo' + Il" (R, -Ro) + Il" Ro) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of -�, and 
k = 0,1,2 
(1) 
In our empirical model we also allow for the possibility of 
asymmetric effects for· the regional economic variables between above­
national-average snd below-national-average regians. The way we 
introduce this non-linearity is by specifying the effect of an economic 
variable r as b, (r,-ro)+b, 1 r,-ro l , so that for regions where r is above the 
national average, the total effect of (r,-ro) is b,+b, and for regions where 
r,<ro' the total effect of (r,-ro) is b,-b,. 
The data used come from the Spanish Migration Survey 
("Encuesta de Migraciones") ·which is part of the Labour Force Survey 
("Encuesta de Población Activa" (EPA» conducted by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística (lNE-the Spanish National Statistics Office). The 
EPA is conducted on all membera of around 60,000 households 
(approximately 200,000 persons) each quarter. Every second quarter of 
the year some questions concerning the individual's situation one year 
prior to the interview have to be answered as part of the EPA. The 
questions relate to the region of residence, the situation wíth respect to 
the labour market t the source of earnings snd the economic sector, all 
thes .. referred to the 20' quarter of the previous year. In our study an 
individual is considered as havíng migrated if his current region of 
residence differs from the one he had the previous year. 
The Migration Survey started in its current form in 1987. We 
have five cross-sections of data, corresponding to the surveys from 1987 
to 1991, which we pool together. The pooling is crucial given the low 
proportion of inter-regional migrants in Spaln. We only have 664 migrants 
in our sample for these yeara, who account for 0.295% of the total of 
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224,714 individuals. It is interesting to compare tbis to the UK where, for 
a single cross-section from the British Labour Force of 1984, Pissarldes 
and Wadsworth (1989) report 1.12% of migrants in thelr sample, wbich is 
almost four times ours. In theory, pooling would allow us to study the 
effect of general economic conditions (national aggregate economic 
variables) that may influence migration decisions. For example, the 
probability of migration may be lower at bigher overa1l unemployment 
rates (Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989». However, we only have five 
years of data and tbis is not much to assess the impact of business cycle 
variables. We wiIl, however, pursue these considerations in the next 
sectioD. 
Our sample includes men, aged 16 to 70, who are In the labour 
force both at the time of the survey and a year befare. The sample is also 
confined to Spanish citizens not living abroad at the time of the survey or 
in the previous year (those in the North African enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla are not included either) 3. We exclude women because their 
migration behavlour could be quite different from that of meno Married 
women in particular "are more likely to be tied moverstt, quoting Mincer 
(1978). Men who are not household heads are inc1uded because it is 
important to assess whether the family ties of people living with parents 
or relatives affect their migratlon behavlour. 
It ls important to distinguish between variables defined at the 
time of the survey and those defined one year earlier. When studying the 
determinants of migration we have to use mainly information about the 
individua!'s situation a year earlier (Le. befare moving), otherwise 
possible c 
.... 
onsequences of migration are Hkely to be canfused with causes 
of migration. We do assume however that the household structure (marital 
status and cbildren) is exogenous in the sense of not being lnfiuenced by 
migra tian decisions. 
With raspect to the general economic variables used, we have to 
take into account that the survey ls about migration decisions over the 
past 12 months and that when people make thelr migration decislon, they 
use prior ecaDomic indicators in assessing their choice. Therefore t we use 
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macroeconomic variables that are averages of the values over the year 
ending in the second quarter of the year before the survey. 
In the Data Appendix, we report detailed information about the 
construction of the variables used in this work. We also provide Tables 
with information on the data, both about our sample of individuals from 
the EPA and about the general economic variables. Figures showing the 
evolution of the regional differentials of the economic variables are also 
provided. 
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Ill. RESULTS 
Our final results. corresponding to the maximum likelihood 
estimation of (1) assuming a logistic distribution for F. are presented in 
column 1 of Table 2'. Another informative way of highlighting the effects 
of different factors on the probability of migration is by calculating the 
implicit predicted probabilities for some individual types and seeing how 
these probabilities change when various factors change. We report the 
result of this exercise (based on the estimates of column 1) in Table 3. 
1. Estimated effecta of personal characteriatics 
We begin by considering the direct effects of the person's 
characteristics' on the probability of migration. They all have the 
expected sign. The probability of migration is higher for young people. 
particularly for those aged 25 to 34. and is much lower for the over 50's. 
Higher education increases the probability of migration and people with 
primary education are the less prone to migrate. The probabilities 
estimated in Table 3 show that having higher education more than doubles 
the probability of migration. The dummies describing the family structure 
are very interesting. Aside from the strong negative effect of children6 
on the probability of migrating, we obtain an even stronger negative 
effect if the person is single and not head of a household. This confirms 
Mincer's hypothesis of very low migration rates for single people living 
with parents or relatives. This may be particularly important in Spain 
where family bonds are strong. Another very significant "tie" that 
diminishes the probability of migration is to have a working wife. This 
may be of some relevance for expJaining part of the decrease in migration 
over time given the increase in the female participation rate. 
Let us now examine the effect of the individual's own employment 
situation. The unemployed not registered at the official employment office 
have the highest probability of migrating in the next twelve months. 
Employed persons come next. However. being a registered unemployed 
person significanUy reduces the probability of migrating other things 
being equal. From Table 3 (last two columns). the probability of migrating 
for a person not registered as unemployed is more than four times greater 
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than for a person registered as unemployed. As can be seen in the Data 
Appendix, the registration dummy can be quite safely taken to capture an 
important portion of the people registered in the 2nd quarter of the year 
prior to the twelve-month period where the migration decision is 
observed. Why do registered people tend to migrate less? One possibility 
is to attribute this situation to unemployment benefits, since registration 
is a necessary condition for receiving benefits and the official register is 
not seen to perform well as an employment agency. Benefits may reduce 
the incentive to migrate in search of a job. Furthermore, it is often the 
case that individuals alternate periods of employment with periods of 
unemployment with benefits and expectations of getting the same kind of 
job again, on an on-off basis. Examples can readily be found in 
agriculture, the canning industry and tourism-related activities. 
However, we do not have enough information in our data to confirm the 
benefit hypothesis because we do not know whether the individual was 
receiving benefits the previous year. Another possible factor would be 
that, as a consequence of moving to a different region in search of work, 
the individual may lose his order on the Official Employment List. Indeed, 
if the individual registers in his new region Official Employment Office in 
the first two weeks after moving, he does not lose his seniority rights but 
the order on the new list will probably be different. The importance of the 
registration variable can be seen by looking at the results if it is not 
included (Table 4 column 1). In this case, being unemployed does not 
affect significantly the probability of migration; that is, being 
unemployed or employed appears to be irrelevant for the migration 
decision. It is only when the registration variable is included (column 2 
Table 4) that we are able to disentangle two significant effects of the 
opposite sign: a positive effect for the unregistered unemployed, and a 
negative one for the registered unemployed. Among employed people, 
employees tend to migrate more than the self-employed, particularly 
employees in the public sector. This higher mobility of civil servants is 
natural, given that they move with jobs. It should also be added that 
during our sample period an important process of administrative 
decentralisation has taken place. Being over three years in the job 
reduces migration. As for the probability of migration according to 
economic sector, people in construction are more mobile, followed, in that 
order, by services, agriculture and industry7. 
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As a measure of the importance of the individual characteristics, 
it is useful to know that the percentage of concordant pairs for a model 
where only our chosen personal characteristics are included, but not 
regional variables, is 69. 6%. 
2. Estimated effects of regional economic variables 
Let us now examine the effect of the economic conditions in the 
region of origin (as compared to the national average) on the probability 
of migration. The only (observable) factors that turn out to be 
influential, in one way or another, are the following: unemployment rate 
differentials, differentials in the growth of the participation rate, real 
house price differentials and real wage differentials. 
We will first discuss the effect of unemployment rate 
differentials. To be able to make sense of the effect of regional 
unemployment, it is essential to take into account the particular situation 
of each individual. On its own, the regional unemployment differential has 
a strong, wrong-signed (negative) effect (see column 2 Table 4); that is, 
people from regions with an unemployment rate above the national average 
would have a lower probability of migrating. Da Vanzo (1978) has shown, 
for the US, that interacting regional unemployment with an unemployed 
person dummy gives significant and correctly signed results. In our case 
this did not solve the puzzle (see Table 4 column 3) (nor did it for 
Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989». In view of the result, we tried 
potentially omitted variables like the differentials in the rate of change of 
the unemployment rate, in the rate of change of employment, in vacancy 
rates or in labour market tightness. We also tried disaggregating by 
economic sector the regional unemployment rate differentials and the 
above-mentioned variables. Disaggregated regional unemployment 
produces astonishingly similar results. None of the other potentially 
omitted variables (aggregated or disaggregated) changed our results 
either; We had to take into account a rich range of the person's 
characteristics to obtain reasonable results. Here, the introduction of the 
registered dummy is significant as well (see Table 4 column 4). The 
results in Table 2 column 1 indicate that the effect on the probability of 
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migration of the regional unemployment differential will vary in the 
following way': 
Effect of Regional Unemployment Differential= 
(4.19' higher eduCation +3.62 • unemployed -13.81 • registered at 
Employment Office -8.32 • single not head of household -5.13 • 
children) • Regional Unemployment Rate Differential. 
This shows that higher-than-average regional unemployment will 
barely induce people to migrate if they are unemployed, but not if they 
are registered. In principle, this would also imply that the registered 
unemployed would have a higher probability of migrating than the 
unregistered unemployed, when they are in lower-than-average 
unemployment rate regions. We introduced the possibility of an 
asymmetric effect, i. e. different effects for registered people in lower­
than-average unemployment regions and for those in the above-average 
ones. The effect was significant and of the expected sign (I. e. positive 
for low unemployment regions). This means that registered people have 
a lower probability of migrating both in higher- and in lower-than­
average regions. However, when this extra effect is allowed for, the 
additive effect of registration in employment offices diminishes and loses 
significance although the total effect of registration remains significant 
and strong. The fit seems to be slightly worse as well. In any case it is 
difficult to distinguish between these two very similar models. The total 
effect of being registered in our reported model is (-1.48 -13.81 • 
Unemployment Rate Differential). In our data, the region with the lowest 
unemployment rate has an unemployment rate differential of -0.09 and 
hence the total effect would never be positive for our sample. 
One might think that the effect of registration is the result of the 
existence of a special benefit in Andalucla and Extremadura for the 
unemployed in agriculture. We tried the effect (both additively and 
interacted) of a dummy for people unemployed in agriculture (last year) 
living in Andalucia or Extremadura. This variable works in the same 
direction as the registration dummy but it is significant only if added 
either additively or interactively and it is in any case not as significant 
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as the registration variable. We have also introduced both the special 
benefit dummy and the registration dummy (the latter modified to exclude 
people on the special agriculture benefit) . We cannot reject that both 
coefficients are the same (this is valid if both variables are introduced 
either additively or interactively) . Therefore, registered people in other 
regions and other occupations that are also included in the broader 
registration variable do matter and behave in the same way, reinforcing 
the effect. 
Having higher education will influence in the expected direction. 
The presence of children (or living with relatives) will reduce the 
probability of migration for people in high unemployment regions. On the 
other hand J from the results in column 4 J Table 4 J the regional 
unemployment differential does not seem to influence significantly the 
decision of employed people (except for the employed with higher 
education, children or living with relatives) . One possible reason (among 
others) may be that employed people that migrate do so with jobs (but we 
cannot confirm this without a model where migration and current 
employment status were jointly determined). Employed people with 
children have a higher probability of moving from a lower than average 
unemployment region; this may reflect people seeking to improve their 
quality of life because of the children (we shall talk more about this factor 
in what follows) .  
One important conclusion here is that regional unemployment will 
have a completely different influence on individuals depending on their 
family and employment situation. This makes perfect sense and highlights 
the overwhelming importance of individual characteristics and the need to 
take into account microdata information in studying migration behaviour. 
Personal characteristics not only have a direct, independent effect, but 
are also important in explaining the influence of local conditions. 
We now turn to the effect of differentials in the rate of change of 
the participation rate. It seemed important to take into account this 
variable (together with the unemployment rate) given the changes in the 
participation rate during the 80's in Spain. It proved to be significant. 
People in regions with an above-average increase in participation are more 
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likely to migrate. This may reflect participation growth driving away 
people because they face more difficulties in finding a job. Our evidence 
points slightly towards higher education tending to cancel out the positive 
effect of the regional participation growth. This influence of education is 
weak but goes in the expected direction, with people with a higher 
education having better job opportunities and information. We report it 
as a further illustration of the potential importance of personel 
characteristics in order to explain the effect of regional conditions. 
House price differentials are one of the most important elements 
in cost-of-living variations'. In the second half of the 80's Spain 
experienced substantial house price increases in some regions. It is 
interesting to see in which sense these important variations may have 
influenced the pattern of migrations between regions. In the EPA there 
is no information about the individual's housing tenure. We use regional 
differentials in the price of owner-occupied housing. Owner occupation 
in Spain is very high (around 82%) and includes subsidised housing. It 
would also be desirable to study the effect of regional rented housing 
prices; however, there are no meaningful data on prevailing rents in 
Spain. At this point it should be noted that since we are studying the 
probability of migrating in general (Le. of leaving a region without 
consideration of the destination) here we will be able to capture only the 
influence of house prices in the region of origin. Without a place-to-place 
model we cannot capture the "attraction" or "disincentive" effect of house 
prices prevailing in destination regions. 
Given that housing expenditure on owner-occupied housing is 
not only a consumption decision but also an investment one, we allowed for 
an asy;;'metric effect of house price differentials between higher- and 
lower-than-average-house-price regions (column 1, Table 2). The 
difference is significant and as a result the coefficient for higher-than­
average-house-price regions is 2.154 (=0.675+1.479) and for lower-than­
average is -0.804(=0.675-1.479)10. This shows that people in .... gions 
with higher-tban-average houae pricea have a strong incentive to 
migrate. We will discuss later how we think this ties up with the other 
observed factors to explain the current pattern of regional migration. Low 
regional house prices also induce people to migrate but the effect is much 
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smaller than the previous one and may be due to low house prices 
espturing other undesirable characteristics of the region. 
Finally, let us look at the estimated effects of real wa� 
differentials. This varisble has the opposite sign to what we would have 
expected if we believe wage differentisls correct disequilibrium by 
encouraging migration from low wage regions. However, no asymmetries, 
potentially observed omitted varisbles or personal characteristics 
interactions proved signiflesnt. People tend to leave from high real wage 
regions. There are several possible expisnations. The first one would be 
that the regional wage is an overly aggregated measure to be relevant to 
the individual. We are not able to disaggregate in any way since regional 
wages by economic sector are not available for this period. Along the same 
lines it is possible that a significant proportion of employed people tend 
to leave high wage regions in search of better prospects for promotion. 
We could not identify such an effect given the scarce information on the 
employment status of the individual prior to the migration decision. For 
example, the professional status at the time Is not available for a 
potentially meaningful interaction. Another appealing expisnation is the 
quallty-of-lIfe motive, that is, people leaving high wage regions because 
of an increased demand (once a certain level of income is reached) for 
better quality of life (see Greenwood (1985». Regional wage differentisls 
could then be seen as compensating differentials (see Roback (1982». 
People leaving from regions with high house prices and high 
wages might reflect return migrations of individuals having originally 
migrated from the poor region of origin in the GO's and 70·s. However, we 
tried interactions of some Individual varisbles that would espture this 
situation like age near retirement, and they do not help to expisln this 
effect. Specifically, it is not the esse in our sample that retiring people 
are those who leave the more prosperous regions. Another possibility we 
have explored is that many of the people who leave, for example, Madrid, 
have simply changed their residence and commute to work to Madrid. 
However, only 4.5% of the Individuals migrating from Madrid live in the 
. contiguous regions of Castllis-Le6n and Castllis La Mancha and decisre 
themselves to be working in Madridll• 
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From the estimated regional effects and their interactions with 
individual characteristics, we can see that the reasons that make people 
at present migrate to another region in Spain are different from the 
reasons that made people move in the 60's and 70's. People that move now 
seem to do so in search of cheaper housing, better quality of life and 
perhaps professional promotion. High regional unemployment or own 
unemployment no longer trigger substantial migrations from people in poor 
regions. Unemployment will only increase the probability of migration if 
the individual has higher education, or is unemployed and not registered 
as such. These factors seem to be behind the observed facts that people 
are leaving regions like Madrid, Catalufla or the Pais Vasco and staying 
in (and even moving to) regions like Andalucia or Extremadura. 
3. Potential effects of national aggregate economic variables 
With this data set we could also try to study the effect of 
aggregate economic variables. Indeed, since we are poolil1:g five cross­
sections of the EPA (corresponding to the 2nd quarters of five years) we 
could exploit the time variation, aside from the rich cross-section 
(individual and regional) variation, to see whether variables like the 
national unemployment rate affect the individual's migration decision, i.e. 
to what extent national economic variables affect the individual's decision 
beyond his own status and his region's economy. However, we are 
reluctant to do so because with such a short period (I) we cannot really 
include at the same time all the variables that one would reasonably think 
of to properly specify the model; and (U) we could just be capturing the 
correlation present in the short period available. For example, on its own, 
the rate of change of the unemployment rate is significant, with an 
estimated coefficient of 2.21 (t-ratio=2. 78). This (counter-intuitive) 
positive sign may just be picking up the fact that for the period 1987-
1991, unemployment (and the rate of change of unemployment) has been 
mainly declining, as has migration. However, we are also able to identify 
a significantly negative interaction of the unemployment change with the 
registered unemployed dummy (-9.85, t-ratio=2. 05). In this case again 
(very much as for regional unemployment), the national unemployment 
change effect corresponding to the unregistered unemployed is barely 
significant (3.44, t-ratio=1.49) and is completely insignificant for the 
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employed (-1.04, t-ratio=O.42). This would imply that growing national 
unemployment may not affect the individual's migration decision, except 
if the person is registered as unemployed. In this case, growing 
unemployment at the national level will diminish even further the person's 
probability of migrating. On the same lines, the only other aggregate 
variable that proved significant was the rate of change of employment, 
with a negative coefficient. Interestingly, if we also introduce the 
percentage of people with temporary contracts, both variables are jointly 
(but not individually) significant with negative coefficients. It is difficult 
to distinguish which part of the negative effect is due to employment 
growth (people migrating less because employment prospects in general 
improve) and which part is due to the fact that part of this employment 
growth is achieved by temporary contracts (people migrate less because 
temporary contracts are less attractive and not worth moving for) . 
In any case, with our sample period, we cannot be assertive as 
to the role of national aggregate variables. However an important point is 
that their inclusion does not alter the results on the effects of the 
individual and regional variables (more on this point below). 
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IV. MISSPECIFICATION ANALYSIS 
Once we obtained a satisfactory logit model, we subjected it to 
some misspecification tests. 
(i) We added to our chosen specification time dummies that will allow 
for all possible aggregate time varying effects. This did not affect in any 
way our estimated regional effects (see Table 2 column 3) that do vary 
over time; these truly reflect cross-sectional regional differences. The 
percentage of concordant pairs increased by 0.2 only. Furthermore J we 
have estimated a model replacing all our regional variables (and their 
interactions) by sixteen regional dummies and four time dummies. The 
increase in our measure of predictive power was only 0.1% (reaching 
73.7%). The diference in predictive power (0.1%) with the previous model 
(our chosen model with four added time dummies) reflects (as a lower 
bound) that interactions of regional variables with individual 
characteristics are not only important for the interpretation of the 
estimated effects of the regional variables but also contribute to increase 
the predictive power. If only the sixteen regional dummies are included, 
the percentage of concordant pairs is 73.4%. Hence our model does well as 
far as predictive power is concerned, compared to heavily parameterised 
models with dummies. The advantage of our specification as far as 
economic interpretation is concerned is obvious. 
We also explored the possibility that our estimated regional 
effects (in particular the wage and house price differentials) are picking 
up spurious correlation due to time variation of the regional differentlaIs 
by adding to our model sixteen regional dummies and aggregate variables. 
The results confirm that the regional effects we capture are indeed 
genuine. 
(il) We estimated the model assuming a normal rather than a logistic 
distribution fuction (Table 2, column 2). The estimated effects with the 
probit model are very similar to the ones with the logit". To test 
whether one of the two models fits the data better than the other we 
performed a likelihood ratio-type test for non-nested hypotheses applying 
the method proposed by Vuong (1989). The test statistic is as follows: 
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where 
LRV 
m - i -i 1 - (probit)i (legit)1' 
L represents the maximised log-likelihood, 
i, represents the estimated log-likelihood for each observation, 
and N is the sample size. 
Under the null hypothesis that the two models fit the data equally well, 
LRV has a distribution N(O, 1) in large samples. In our case LRV=-1.51, 
hence we cannot discriminate between the two competing models given the 
data. 
Aside from comparing the logit model with the problt model which 
is the obvious parametric alternative, we considered a test against a more 
general semi-parametric binary model where the density function is 
estimated. However, an estimation procedure such as that proposed by 
Klein and Spady (1993) is not readily available in our case because of the 
very large number of observations involved 13 • 
(ill) Another way to test our specification is to split the sample in 
subsamples and perform a likelihood ratio test comparing the restricted 
model estimated from the complete sample with the unrestricted model 
estimated from the subsamples. Notice that given the small number of 
migrants we can split the sample Into two at the most. We try to break the 
sample in such a way as to obtain two subsamples where one of them has 
clearly a higher mean probability of migration (but at the same time the 
two subsamples should have a sufficient number of migrants). In this way 
we would check whether estimating the model using different probability 
ranges does change the results. We performed two different sample 
s tra tiflca tions. 
First, we split the sample by age, into one subsample with the 
people aged 25-34 which is the age group most prone to migration (0.56% 
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observed migrants), and another with the rest (0.21% observed 
migrants). We have 319 migrants in the first subsample and 345 in the 
second. This produces a likelihood ratio test of 16.7 with 23 degrees of 
freedom which easily accepts that the estimated models are equivalent". 
Second, we split the sample according to head of household 
status. In the first subsample we have the head of household (with 369 
migrants, representing O. 24% of the subsample) and In the second the non 
head of household, with a higher migration frequency (and 295 migrants 
representing 0.41% of the subsample). In this case the LR test is 22.14 
with 20 degrees of freedom which would not reject the null hypothesis at 
any reasonable significance level. Furthermore, account should be taken 
of the very high number of observations and the fact that if we estimated 
the restricted models dropping all the insignificant variables (their effect 
probably cannot be well identified given the number of migrants in the 
subsamples) the number of degrees of freedom would Increase (by more 
than ten) and Hi would be even more clearly rejected15• 
We therefore believe that the results we present In Table 2 
column 1 are reasonably robust. 
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V. FURTHER COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents evidence on the importance for the migration 
decision in Spain of the person's situation, in particular: 
(i) family characteristics, such as being married to a working woman, 
having children, or living with relatives 
(il) personal factors such as education or age and 
(ill) own employment situation such as being registered as unemployed as 
opposed to non-registered, or being self-employed. 
The paper also studies the influence of regional economic 
variables and reveals that interactions between these and personal 
characteristics are crucial for explaining the current pattern of regional 
migration flows in Spain. Personal characteristics not only have an 
important direct effect on migrations but they also alter the effect of some 
regional economic variables on the migration decision and' affect the 
interpretation of these regional effects. The findings about the effects of 
the regional variables described in the previous section help us explain 
the present pattern of inter-regional migration in Spain. In the first 
place, individuals, due to their family situation and more importantly, due 
to the register system, do not respond to their own unemployment nor to 
high unemployment in their regions by migrating. This explains why 
people from high unemployment regions like Andalucla or Extremadura do 
not move to more prosperous regions J as they used to do in the 60's and 
up to the mid 70's. Second, the people that move are from regions where 
house prices and wages are higher than average and hence they probably 
move in search of cheaper housing, better quality of life and professional 
promotion. People leave from regions like Madrid and Catalufia. These 
moves do not seem to be return migrations because they do not affect 
particularly people near retirement age. Hence, the important point is 
that the people that move are not the same kind of people that used to do 
so; the reasons behind migration decisions in Spain have changed. 
Whether this is a desirable situation or not depends on the state of the 
regional labour markets. The appreciation of this situation will be 
different if, for example, Madrid's labour market needs people (of the 
kind who are leaving, or of the kind that are failing to come) or if, on the 
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contrary) it is facing tlsaturation" and the direction of the current flows 
might encourage development in the traditionally poorer regions. But that 
is another story . 
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Data Appendix 
Individual Characteristics dummies 
Source: Labour Force Surveys ("Encuesta de Poblaci6n Activa") from 1987 
to 1991 (2'· quarters), provided by the "Instituto Nacional de Estadistica" 
(INE-National Statistics Office). 
Migration. The migration survey provides the place of residence one year 
prior to the sampling (if different from current one) and the current 
province of residence). We group the provinces in the standard 17 
regions or "Comunidades Aut6nomas", and define migration as a change 
in the region of residence, as compared to one year prior to the sampling. 
Educational level. We consider the following categories: 
Illiterate and no schooling 
Primary education 
Low secondary education 
Upper secondary education 
Higher education 
Household composition. The persons living in a household are asked about 
their relationship with the household. Taking into account the 
organisation of the survey we constructed a coding system to be able to 
assign to each head of household variables such as wife working the 
previous year, children, children younger than 16, and children working 
the previous year. 
If the individual is not head of household, we only know whether he is 
single or married. 
Economic sector one year prior to the sampling. For people who were 
employed a year before the survey, the survey provides their economic 
sector at the time, following the two digit classification of the CNAE, 
which we group into agriculture, industry, construction and services. 
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Professiolllll status one yl!Bl' before the interview. Individuals employed 
the previous year provide their professional status at the time, and we 
classify them into employees and self-employed, and the former into wage 
earners in the public sector and in the private sector. 
Situation with respect to the labour market one year before the interview. 
People in our sample are classified as employed, or unemployed, all 
refered to the year prior to the survey. 
Job tenure. We define a job tenure dummy for people whose job tenure last 
year was three years or over. To construct this variable we use 
information about current working status, current tenure, prior-year 
working status, tenure in last-held job, and time elapsed since last job. 
Proxy for people registered at the Employment Office (INEM) one YI!Bl' 
before the interview. Individuals answer a question stating whether they 
are currently registered at the State Employment Office but no 
information is provided on the status the previous year. A proxy for 
registration one year before is constructed by assuming that people 
currently registered who were unemployed last year were also registered 
last year. 
In Table Al we provide the sample frequencies of the individual variables. 
Regiolllll Economic Variables. 
We assign to each individual his corresponding regional economic 
variables, according to his region of residence the previous year. It is 
important to emphasise that the survey data for the 2nd quarter of 1991 
assesses the migration behaviour with respect to the 2nd quarter of 1990 
(i.e. if the individual has changed residence (moved) between the 2nd 
quarter of 1990 and the 2nd quarter of 1991). We assume that the 
individual makes the migration decision between both quarters taking into 
account the economic information of the year prior to the 2nd quarter of 
reference. 
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Therefore, the economic information relevant to the migration 
decision between 1990 (2nd quarter) and.1991 (2nd quarter) will be the 
one prevailing between the 2nd quarter of 1989 and the 1st quarter of 
1990, both included. In the Tables labelled A2 the series under 1990, for 
example, are the average between 1989 (2" quarter) and 1990 (I" 
quarter) and will be used as explanatory variables of the migration 
decision observed in the 1991 (2" quarter) EPA. 
The influence of regional economic variables is introduced as the 
difference between the regional value of the variable and the national one. 
The variables considered are: 
Unemployment rate. Source: "Encuesta de Poblaci6n Activa" (EPA) and 
"Series Revisadas EPA (1977-87)", INE. 
We also tried the regional and national unemployment rates 
disaggregated by economic sector. If the individuals are employed they 
are assigned to the unemployment rate differential of their economic 
sector, but·if they are unemployed we have two cases: if they worked in 
the past we assign to them the economic sector unemployment rate 
differential of the last job held, and if they do not have previous work 
experience we assign to them the general unemployment rate differential. 
Vacancies. The vacancy rate is defined as the ratio of the region's 
vacancies to the region's labour force. Source: tlEstad1sticas de Empleo", 
"Instituto Nacional de Empleo" (INEM). 
The vacancies differential has also been disaggregated by 
economic sector. 
Labour Market tightness. Labour market tightness is defined as the ratio 
of unemployment to vacancies (Pissarides, 1991). 
Cost of living. The cost-of-Iiving variable is the Consumer Price Index 
(IPC). Source: INE. 
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Real wage .  The differential is taken to be the difference between the 
logarithms of regional real wages and national real wages. Source: 
"Contabilidad Regional de Espaiia" and "Encuesta de Salarios" (INE). 
Real house price .. The regional differential is defined as the difference 
between the logarithms of regional real house prices and the national real 
house price. Source: "Sociedad de Tasaci6n". 
Rate of change of participation rate. Source: "Encuesta de Poblaci6n 
Activa" (EPA) and "Series Revisadas EPA (1977-87)", INE. 
Employment growth rate. Source: "Encuesta de Poblaci6n Actlva (EPA)" 
and "Series Revisadas EPA (1977-87)", INE. 
In Tables A2 we report the series used for the different general economic 
variables. We also present figures showing the differentials over time of 
the regional economic variables that turned out to effect significantly the 
migration decision. 
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Table &1. Personal characteristics 
Migrants Non-migrants 
No. • No. • 
Total 664 (0.30) 224050 (99.70) 
Age 
16-24 131 (19.73) 32873 (14.67) 
25-34 319 (48.04) 57089 (25.48) 
35-49 168 (25.30) 75550 (33.72) 
50-65 46 (6.93) 56810 (25.36) 
66-70 0 (0.00) 1728 (0.77) 
Education 
No schooling 48 (7.23 ) 26050 (11. 63) 
Primary 324 (48.80) 146505 (65.39) 
Low secondary 125 (18.83) 23585 (10.53) 
upper secondary 72 (10.84) 16458 (7.35 ) 
Higher 95 (14.31) ll452 (5.U) 
Family Status 
Head of Household 369 (55.57) 152707 (68.16) 
Harried 396 (59.64) 156064 (69.66) 
Children 238 (35.84) 131293 (58.60) 
Prior-year Labour 
Force Statue 
unemployed 99 (14.91) 34152 (15.24) 
Employed 565 (85.09) 189898 (84.76) 
Prior-year Economic 
Sector 
Agriculture 29 (5.13) 30103 (15.85) 
Industry 82 (14.51) 48846 (25.72) 
Construction 109 (19.29) 24023 (12.65) 
Services 345 (61.06) 86926 (45.78) 
Prior-:-year 
Professional status 
Self-employed 50 (8.85) 57204 (30.12 ) 
Employees 
private sector 353 (62.48) 103499 (54.50) 
public sector 162 (28.67) 29195 (15.37) 
Prior-year Job 
tenure (�3years) 212 (31.93) 131321 (58.61) 
Proxy for prior-year 
registration at the 
Employment Office 23 (3.46) 20947 (9.35) 
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Table A2.. Regional Bconomic Data 
Table A2 . l  Unemployment rate ( ' )  
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
AND 2 9 . 1 1  3 0 . 2 3  3 0 . 3 5  3 0 . 2 7  2 8 . 82 2 6 . 48 2 5 . 5 2  
ARA 1 6 . 29 1 7 . 3 1  1 5 . 69 13.99 13 . 41 1 1 . 40 9 . 16 
AST 1 6 . 40 1 8 . 7 5  19 . 66 2 0 . 14 1 8 . 92 17 . 96 16 . 66 
BAL 13 . 79 14.06 1 4 . 98 12 . 73 1 0 . 9 6  1 0 . 6 2  1 0 . 61 
CAN 2 3 . 5 6  2 5 . 94 2 5 . 71 2 3 . 3 2  2 2 . 20 2 1 .  73 2 3 . 2 1  
CNT 15 . 39 16 . 13 18.10 1 9 . 54 20 . 59 1 7 . 1 5  1 6 . 2 3  
CLM 1 6 . 73 1 6 . 0 1  15 . 7 8 1 5 . 05 1 5 . 03 1 3 . 82 12 . 79 
CLE 16 . 52 18 . 36 1 7 . 86 17 . 25 17 . 52 15 . 98 1 5 . 2 5  
CAT 2 2 . 2 8  2 2 . 46 2 1 . 05 2 0 . 7 5  17 . 72 13 . 69 12 . 48 
CVA 20 . 19 2 0 . 38 19 . 52 1 8 . 60 1 6 . 68 1 5 . 05 1 4 . 40 
EXT 2 7 . 41 2 7 . 62 2 7 . 28 2 6 . 70 2 6 . 58 2 5 . 90 23 . 80 
GAL 1 1 . 97 12 . 7 6 1 3 . 48 1 2 . 38 12 . 30 1 2 . 1 1  1 1 . 94 
MAD 2 0 . 80 2 2 . 07 19 . 15 1 6 . 90 1 5 . 72 1 2 . 9 1  12 . 17 
HUR 18 . 43 19 . 63 19.99 1 8 . 50 1 7 . 03 1 5 . 78 1 6 . 2 4  
NAV 1 6 . 49 19 . 40 1 8 . 24 1 6 . 00 13 . 93 1 2 . 47 1 1 .  31 
PVA 2 2 . 6 1  2 3 . 79 2 4 . 14 2 2 . 59 2 1 . 52 1 9 . 0 3  1 8 . 63 
LRJ 1 4 . 79 17 . 15 14.90 1 3 . 70 1 2 . 99 9 . 12 8 . 94 
National 2 0 . 7 5  2 1 . 69 2 1 . 09 2 0 . 2 6 1 8 . 9 6  1 6 . 84 1 6 . 08 
Table A2.2. Rea1 wages 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
AND 799 . 8  805 . 2  831 . 1  824 . 1  836 . 2  837 . 4  
ARA 952 . 2  95 1 . 3  971 . 3  9 67 . 9  983 . 1  97 5 . 4  
AST 977 . 7  986 . 1  996 . 4  991 . 0  1015 . 6  1016.2 
BAL 815 . 3  828 . 9  852 . 6  835 . 9  868 . 5  850 . 6  
CAN 7 52 . 7  767 . 6  772 . 3  7 75 . 7  777 . 7  7 83 . 8  
CNT 838 . 4  840.0 882 . 4  881. 6 901 . 1  919 . 1  
CLM 672 . 6  680 . 7  708.4 7 1 4 . 2  723 . 0  738 . 6  
CLE 873 . 0  8 72 . 1  871 . 9  871 . 8  876 · 7  894 . 3  
CAT 879 . 2  886 . 6  899 . 6  893 . 2  903 . 2  905 . 7  
CVA 733 . 0  733 . 4  736 . 6  723 . 6  735 . 4  761. 7 
EXT 763 . 9  757 . 2  808 . 2  802 . 3  827 . 3  808 . 8  
GAL 774 . 3  7 79 . 4  7 83 . 2  749 . 7  767 . 5  780 . 1  
MAD 1036 . 9  1046.8 1061. 7 1040 . 7  1064 . 2  1087 . 8  
HUR 637 . 2  642 . 2  663 . 6  658 . 6  788 . 1  743 . 4  
NAV 838 . 8  847 . 7  877 . 8  868 . 6  884 . 8  894 . 7  
PVA 1028 . 8  103 4 . 4  1046.8 1019 . 7  104 2 . 3  " 107 1 . 5  
LRJ 651 . 9  671 . 2  7 16 . 5  696 . 7  696 . 9  7 12 . 5  
Nat. 826 . 6  873 . 6  888 . 5  878 . 1  893 . 9  906 . 9  
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Table A2 . 3 .  Real Rouse price. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
AND 399.859 415.061 472.393 581.211 661. 760 6 7 1 . 151 
ARA 412 . 279 450 . 15 1  467 . 7 78 541. 120 725 . 302 723.934 
AST 484.601 507.195 634.753 780 . 2 1 0  949. 663 906.843 
SAL 330.879 387 . 506 524 . 735 628.221 642. 180 681. 943 
CAN 392 . 309 439. 090 583.358 717 . 175 817 . 132 814 . 2 9 6  
CNT 475. 725 563.621 632.341 811. 384 935 . 382 951. 510 
CLM 365 . 006 394 . 462 450.733 529 . 593 601.434 616.268 
CLE 356.393 412 . 806 501. 530 620. 642 726 . 439 745 . 757 
CAT 447.637 546. 503 764.136 943.175 1088 . 616 1142 . 943 
CVA 355. 664 420.412 489 . 5 71 600.298 689. 040 665.979 
EXT 336.288 429. 733 538.154 539 . 631 532.477 522 . 447 
GAL 409 . 238 470 . 9 5 1  5 3 1 .  788 567.025 603 . 337 645 . 9 2 1  
HAD 700.534 913.944 1159 . 466 1387.445 1515 . 976 1447 . 337 
MUR 410. 492 392 . 476 42 7 . 743 5 2 1 . 2 2 6  598.515 623.705 
NAV 434. 282 597.865 686.852 7 5 3 . 515 807.155 82 5 . 263 
PVA 531. 827 5 5 9 . 280 656.915 776 . 735 889. 100 9 2 7 . 538 
LRJ 598.285 605.916 626.329 634. 882 644.307 6 7 1 . 996 
Nat. 4 7 1 . 658 558.072 686.915 829.817 937 . 608 938.348 
Table A2 . 4 .  Rate of change of participation rate 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
AND 0 . 007720 0 . 010122 0 . 058193 0 . 007615 -0. 003703 -0. 003298 
ARA -0 . 002695 0 . 010291 0 . 008452 -0. 009170 0 . 014117 0 . 008138 
AST 0 . 014002 -0. 005788 0 . 015463 -0.016151 -0. 012588 -0.014724 
SAL -0. 024628 0 . 006493 0 . 025196 0 . 052047 0 . 023439 -0. 000880 
CAN -0 . 002617 0 . 001702 0 . 007424 0 . 022429 0 . 003366 -0. 013040 
CNT 0 . 008609 -0.017786 -0. 009954 0 . 037723 0 . 008227 -0.021726 
eLM -0. 019146 0 . 007955 0 . 028225 -0. 005719 0 . 010269 -0.010432 
CLE -0. 000479 0 . 005447 0 . 020386 0 . 016424 0 . 006598 0 . 010787 
CAT -0 . 003537 0 . 023403 0 . 038034 -0. 008697 0 . 005753 0 . 010526 
CVA -0. 007176 0 . 005948 0 . 037999 -0. 003305 0 . 010435 0 . 015390 
EXT -0 . 023820 0 . 006665 0 . 050595 -0. 010604 0 . 003951 0 . 010074 
GAL -0. 006074 -0. 032828 -0. 003229 0 . 007022 -0.015060 -0.026802 
HAD -0. 005939 0 . 028122 -0. 006779 -0.015678 0. 002146 0 . 018260 
MUR -0. 005114 0 . 007322 0 . 059814 -0.004676 0 . 012811 0 . 030003 
NAV 0 . 045722 -0. 000856 -0. 003251 -0.015316 0 . 023760 0 . 008241 
PVA -0. 015192 0 . 008188 0 . 000670 -0. 005280 0 . 016753 0 . 028439 
LRJ 0 . 015731 -0. 001036 0 . 037124 0 . 028097 -0.033874 -0. 086018 
Nat. -0. 003893 0 . 008187 0 . 02 5028 -0. 000945 0 . 003529 0 . 004270 
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Table A2. 5. Vacancy rates (.) 
1986 1981 1988 1989 1990 1991 
AND 0 . 3256 0 . 3126 0 . 3122 0 . 3598 0 . 4295 0 . 4549 
ARA 0 . 2494 0 . 2634 0 . 2856 0.2912 0 . 2841 0 . 2314 
AST 0 . 5175 0 . 6095 0 . 4094 0 . 4629 0 . 5950 0 . 6823 
SAL 0 . 2336 0 . 42 1 6  0 . 4872 0 . 6484 0 . 5034 0 . 3499 
CAN 0 . 3023 0 . 3801 0 . 4316 0 . 6920 0 . 4481 0 . 3308 
CNT 0 . 2931 0 . 2492 0 . 3136 0 . 3509 0 . 4164 0 . 2191 
CLM 0 . 4254 0 . 4044 0 . 4902 0 . 4110 0 . 5983 0 . 5138 
CLE 0 . 2486 0 . 3112 0 . 3369 0 . 3569 0 . 2 690 0 . 2491 
CAT 0 . 3413 0 . 3632 0 . 3228 0 . 3943 0 . 3640 0 . 2498 
CVA 0 . 3661 0 . 2941 0 . 3553 0 . 3834 0 . 3605 0 . 2 619 
EXT 0 . 3424 0 . 3492 0 . 3059 0 . 3302 0 . 2415 0 . 3252 
GAL 0 . 2690 0 . 1 940 0 . 2201 0 . 2951 0 . 3563 0 . 3551 
MAD 0 . 2 134 0 . 2 251 0 . 2351 0 . 3356 0 . 3239 0 . 2655 
MUR 0 . 4512 0 . 4513 0 . 4514 0 . 6262 0 . 8511 0 . 6296 
NAV 0 . 4560 0 . 4105 0 . 5309 0 . 4601 0 . 4624 0 . 3240 
PVA 0 . 3401 0 . 2 654 0 . 3013 0 . 2522 0 . 2408 0 . 1613 
LRJ 0 . 2930 0 . 5262 0 . 3030 0 . 3160 0 . 5556 0 . 4613 
Nat . 0 . 3191 0 . 3180 0 . 3353 0 . 3839 0 . 3819 0 . 3348 
Table A2.6 .. �te of cbange of employment 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
AND 0 . 010381 0 . 021345 0 . 019720 0 . 041445 0 . 046836 0 . 020955 
ARA -0. 008485 0 . 044319 0 . 034644 0 . 006439 0 . 046641 0 . 019072 
AST -0. 009038 -0. 013644 0 . 011161 0 . 005818 0 . 006290 0 . 021081 
SAL -0.018154 0 . 001921 0 . 010821 0 . 086392 0 . 038422 -0.023113 
CAN -0. 012333 0 . 024108 0 . 013444 0 . 061680 0 . 030192 -0. 030029 
CNT 0 . 006665 -0. 029004 -0.011310 0 . 035189 0 . 063611 -0.010353 
CLM 0 . 022463 0 . 014024 0 . 040860 0 . 021030 0 . 032163 0 . 003048 
CLE -0. 028808 0 . 023034 0 . 044016 0 . 000313 0 . 039139 0 . 015349 
CAT 0 . 002482 0 . 051598 0 . 054458 0 . 039523 0 . 065302 0 . 033961 
CVA 0 . 002560 0 . 022908 0 . 069932 0 . 031861 0 . 042643 0 . 026139 
EXT -0. 009449 0 . 021316 0 . 015193 0 . 003280 0 . 025191 0 . 041168 
GAL -0. 005843 -0. 034522 0 . 021245 0 . 016010 -0.005053 -0.009724 
MAD -0. 004939 0 . 083015 0 . 032848 0 . 013044 0 . 050725 0 . 030305 
MUR 0 . 002926 0 . 012235 0 . 105346 0 . 030535 0 . 044568 0 . 016566 
NAV 0 . 023988 0 . 025498 0 . 032323 0 . 021526 0 . 052608 0 . 003500 
PVA -0.019319 0 . 015041 0 . 031829 0 . 019612 0 . 060240 0 . 019699 
LRJ -0. 000660 0 . 044899 0 . 056872 0 . 049321 0 . 019658 -0.051558 
Nat. -0 . 002455 0 . 021560 0 . 050564 0 . 028205 0 . 042631 0 . 011608 
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Table Al.1. Price index 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
AND 122 . 731 133 . 655 139 . 7 67 146. 290 156 . 099 166 . 6 17 
ARA 121 . 823 131 . 345 13 7 . 565 145. 070 154 . 591 164 . 62 1  
AST 121 . 853 1 3 1 .  015 13 6 . 628 143.455 153 . 291 163 . 479 
SAL 1 2 2 . 175 132 . 708 138.880 145. 490 154 . 552 163 . 504 
CAN 120 . 186 1 2 7 . 651 134.223 139.053 148. 905 1 5 7 . 959 
CNT 1 2 2 . 655 132 . 3 59 137 . 703 144.075 152 . 344 1 6 1 . 060 
CLM 1 2 1 .  642 130.494 136 . 2 78 142. 138 1 5 1 .  388 160.482 
CLE 122 . 828 1 3 1 .  963 13 7 . 679 144.488 1 5 3 . 9 3 6  163.458 
CAT 122 . 365 132 . 936 140. 158 147. 136 158. 160 169 . 9 5 6  
CVA 124.345 133 . 738 140. 480 148.676 159 . 171 169.037 
EXT 123 . 034 132 . 524 137. 879 144.219 153 . 2 46 1 6 1 .  2 6 1  
GAL 1 2 1 . 995 132 . 55 1  139.294 147 . 2 16 158. 038 167 . 861 
MAD 122 . 157 1 3 1 . 162 136. 593 145 . 754 156 . 170 165 . 82 2  
HUR 1 2 1 . 805 131 . 409 138. 401 144 . 75 5  1 5 6 . 638 167 . 146 
NAV 1 2 1 .  753 131 . 761 138.822 145 . 55 1  154. 803 165 . 705 
PVA 124. 148 134.816 142 . 2 56 150. 309 160. 106 170 . 128 
LRJ 1 2 6 . 696 1 3 5 . 250 141 . 519 151 . 09 1  163.005 174. 108 
Nat. 1 2 2 . 599 132 . 196 138. 481 145 . 574 1 5 5 . 555 1 6 5 . 424 
Table Al . 8 .  Participation rate 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
AND 0 . 434885 0 . 438242 0 . 442678 0 . 468439 0 . 472006 0 . 470258 0 . 470449 
ARA 0 . 458884 0 . 457648 0 . 4 62357 0 . 466266 0 . 461990 0 . 468512 0 . 465749 
AST 0 . 472092 0 . 478703 0 . 475932 0 . 483291 0 . 475486 0 . 469500 0 . 4 68485 
SAL 0 . 493480 0 . 481327 0 . 484452 0 . 496658 0 . 522508 0 . 534755 0 . 522048 
CAN 0 . 501200 0 . 499889 0 . 500739 0 . 504457 0 . 515771 0 . 517508 0 . 509046 
CNT 0 . 476276 0 . 480376 0 . 471832 0 . 467135 0 . 484757 0 . 488745 0 . 474225 
CLE 0 . 458320 0 . 449545 0 . 453121 0 . 465911 0 . 463246 0 . 4 68003 0 ; 4 68243 
CLM 0 . 435342 0 . 435133 0 . 437504 0 . 446423 0 . 453754 0 . 456748 0 . 449021 
CAT 0 . 496727 0 . 494971 0 . 506554 0 . 525821 0 . 521248 0 . 524247 0 . 526734 
CVA 0 . 488492 0 . 484986 0 . 487871 0 . 506409 0 . 504736 0 . 510003 0 . 512503 
EXT 0 . 437357 0 . 426939 0 . 429784 0 . 451529 0 . 446741 0 . 448506 0 . 451241 
GAL 0 . 55 1083 0 . 547736 0 . 529755 0 . 528044 0 . 531752 0 . 523743 0 . 517500 
MAD 0 . 479635 0 . 476786 0 . 490195 0 . 486872 0 . 479238 0 . 480267 0 . 487989 
HUR 0 . 464435 0 . 462060 0 . 4 65443 0 . 493283 0 . 490977 0 . 497267 0 . 505707 
NAV 0 . 471745 0 . 493315 0 . 492892 0 . 491290 0 . 483765 0 . 495260 0 . 487752 
PVA 0 . 498836 0 . 491258 0 . 495280 0 . 495612 0 . 492995 0 . 501254 0 . 507015 
LRJ 0 . 450824 0 . 457916 0 . 457442 0 . 474424 0 . 487754 0 . 471232 0 . 445798 
Nat. 0 . 476931 0 . 475075 0 . 478964 0 . 490951 0 . 490487 0 . 492218 0 . 492582 
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NOTES 
1. It should also be noted that sometimes it has been found that the 
effects of destination characteristics are not as precisely 
perceived (estimated) as the origin ones (see Gabriel et al. 
(1991» . 
2. We do not model the joint decisions involved at the household 
level but we take into account the family structure as one factor 
influencing individuals' decision. 
3. We also exclude those individuals who 
(i) did not answer the questions about their relationship with 
the labour market the previous year (these are generally 
people younger than 16 the previous year) 
(ii) did not answer the question about their situation with 
respect to the Employment Office 
(ill) report being in the army either at the time of the survey 
or the previous year . 
4. To reach our final specification , aside from the single coefficient 
t-tests we used Wald tests for the joint significance of some 
parameters and tbose proved relevant due to the existence in 
some cases of high collinearity, depending on how the dummy 
variables were defined. For our chosen measure of goodness of 
fit we looked at the association of predicted probabilities and 
observed responses . This measures how many pairs of 
observations have a concordant response , i . e .  how many pairs 
(with our sample we have over 165 million pairs) with different 
observed responses have predicted probabilities that rank 
accordingly . This measure makes more sense in our case than a 
frequency table of observed and predicted responses . This table 
would be heavily dependent on the cut off probability point 
chosen, above which migration is predicted . This is specially 
important in our case where predicted probabilities in our sample 
range from 0.000025 to 0.1929 with a mean of 0.00295. 
5 .  A detailed description of the variables can be found in the Data 
Appendix . 
6. The results do not change if we allow for more disaggregated 
children dummies . 
7 .  We also considered a sample that includes men out of the labour 
force, either at the time of sampling or in the previous year. 
Among people out of the labour force the previous year, only 
students seem to have a higher probability of migrating than the 
standard employed person, and the rest basically do not respond 
to economic incentives. The parameter estimates are robust to 
this change of sample , except for people In the age group 16 to 
24 who now have the same probability of migrating (other things 
being equal) as those aged 35 to 49; this Is to be expected given 
the inclusion of young dependants in the extended sample . 
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8 .  In going from Table 4 col. 4 to Table 2 col. 1 we drop the 
insignificant regional unemployment differential. In order to 
calculate the predicted probabilities for different cases ( Table 
3) it would be misleading to retain it. 
9. Cost-of-living regionai differentials measured from the Consumer 
Price Index were not significant in our model. 
10. Not allowing for different coefficients for higher-than-average 
house price regions and for lower-than-average ones produces 
a parameter estimate of 0.92 (t-ratio=4 . 6 ) ,  and no significant 
change to the other estimates . This is a reasonable estimate. 
However, the investment decision involved in owner occupation 
leads us to allow for an asymmetric treatment of the effect of 
house prices . Aside from this asymmetric effect being empirically 
significant, the statistics measuring the association of predicted 
probabilities and observed responses improved. Note that 
asymmetries in unemployment, participation change and wage 
differentials are not supported by the data. 
1 1 .  We have also estimated our model dropping the individuals (53 of 
them) who, despite having changed their region of residence, 
declare themselves to be still working in their previous region . 
It is the case that most of these moves are to non-contiguous 
regions , however one could think that these individuals have a 
seasonal job (this hypothesis Is confirmed by their occupation) 
and may go back when needed for work . Therefore , as far as the 
labour market is concerned , they have not migrated. Despite 
leaving them out our results do not change . 
1 2 .  Once we divide the logit estimates by ( n/.f3) , to allow for the 
fect that the standard deviation of the logistic distribution is 
( n/.f3) while that of the standard normal distribution is unity . 
The remaining difference will be due to the difference in the 
distribution function. 
13. We are starting research on these lines . 
14 . The number of degrees of freedom is given by the number of 
parameters in the model estimated with the first subsample plus 
the number of parameters In the model estimated with the second 
subsampJe minus the number of parameters in the model 
estimated with the complete sample . 
15 . We have, of course, already dropped the variables that a priori 
cannot be identified given the nature of the subsample. 
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TAIlLE 1 
OUtmigration and �gration between the Spanish regioDs, 
( 1987-1991 ) .  Sample of adult men in tbe labour force 
Outmigrants lnunigrants 
'" % 
Andalucia 1 1 . 6  18 . 07 
Arag6n 3 . 61 4 . 07 
Asturias 2 . 56 2 . 41 
Baleares 6 . 93 3 . 31 
Canarias 3 . 77 4 . 52 
Cantabria 0 . 45 2 . 86 
cast ilIa la Mancha 4 . 07 10 . 54 
Castilla-Le6n 9 . 04 12 . 50 
Cataluiia 1 1 . 9  5 . 12 
Comunidad Valenciana 6 . 02 5 . 12 
Extremadura 2 . 86 8 . 89 
Galicia 4 . 37 6 . 33 
Madrid 20 . 03 2 . 71 
Murcia 2 . 41 3 . 16 
Navarra 1 . 96 3 . 16 
Pais Vasco 7 . 53 4 . 52 
La Rioj a 0 . 90 2 . 71 
100 100 
Source : "Encuesta de Migraciones" ,  IHE . 
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....... 2 
Final a.u_ted Kigr.tiOllf:rfii��liDg Pooled Q:o •• -seetiDA8 
1 I 2 I 3 (log-it) (probit) ( loqU) 
conatantl -5.012 (22.22) -2.423 (31.88) -4.833 (20.59) 
aged 16 to 24 0.422 (2.83) 0.144 (2.73) 0.404 (2.7:l) 
aged 2S to 3. 0.516 (4.87) 0 . 183 (4.97) 0.512 (4.83) 
a.ged SO to 70 -1.031 (6.11) -0.328 (6.18) -1.035 (6.13) 
primary education -0.441 (5.03) -0.lS7 (5.12 ) -0.451 (5.15) 
higher education 0.423 (3.29) 0.168 (3.48) 0.416 (3.24) 
children -1.019 (10.QO) -0.360 (9.94) -1.027 (10.07) 
not head of hou •• hold, -1.341 (11.87) single (nhh.) 
-0.471 (11.31) -1.331 111.78) 
married with working wife -0.641 (4.85) -0.223 (4.92) -0.630 (4.77) 
unemployed 0.605 (2.85) 0.172 (2.40) 0.588 (2.76) 
raglet.red at INEH -1.484 (5.96) -0.497 (6.12) -1.511 (6.a7) 
tenure � 3 yeara -0.966 (9.18) -0.340 (9.90) -0.980 (9.93) 
::E€g�- in public 
1 .  370 (8.03) 0.459 (8.22) 1.366 (8.01) 
::Eig�- in private 
0.937 (5.99) 0.296 (5.97) 0.945 (6.05) 
ilgriculture -0. 687 (3.19) -0.217 (3.14) -0.718 (3.33) 
industry -0.890 (5.93) -0.312 (6.06) -0.891 (5.94) 
service. -0.234 (1.92 ) -0.089 (2.06) -0.238 (1.96) 
Unemployment differential -- -- --
Unempl.diff. *unemployed 3 .621 ( l . 60) 1. 343 (1.65) 3.743 (1. 65) 
" -reqistered -13.808 (2.86) -4.621 (2.98) -13.643 (2.85) 
" -higher educ. 4 .191 (1. 73) 1.414 ( 1.55) 4.114 (1.70) 
" ·children -5.129 (3.75) -1.757 (3.89) -5.103 (3.74) 
" *nhhll -8.316 (4.80) -2.852 (4.88) -8.267 (4.80) 
participation rate growth 0.129 (4.79) 0.044 (4.58) 0.126 (4.60) 
differential 
P���g.rr:a�ci�
h dift. -0.100 (1.37) -0.027 (0.97) -0.107 (1.44) 
House price difterential 0.675 (3.43) 0.265 (3.77) 0 . 663 (3.33) 
I House price differential I 1.479 (5.62 ) 0.527 (5.64) 1.699 (6.12) 
Real Wage differential 2.576 (5.69) 0.874 (5.61) 2. 427 (5.35) 
DS' -- -- -0.136 (1.09) 
DS' -- -- -0.359 (2.73) 
D.D -- -- -0.261 (2 .08) 
DOl -- -- -0.343 (2.72) 
����i:�aogb�!re�ed�;�;gn.ell 
concordant 73.6' 74.0t 73.8t 
tied 14.2' 13.6t 14.1' 
- log likelihood 3976.04 3980.26 3970.71 
NOTES; 
1. t-ratio. in bracket • •  
2. the conetant term will determine the probability of migrating for individuals with the 
following characteristics; head of household single or married to non working wife (or not 
head, but IlLU'ried) ,  aged between 3S and 49, with either no schooling or e8Condary education, 
no children, ee1f-emp10yed in the conetruction sector with le •• than three year. in the 
current job, and living in a hypothetical region where the value of the relevant regional variables equals the national average. 
3.  Sample .ize=224,714. Migration frequency.0.295t. 
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� 
r 
1'AIILII 3 
Predicted probabilitieB (t) 
Emploved Unemployed 
Agriculture I Construction I Industry I Services Registered I Not regiatered. 
Standard1 0 . 35 0 . 69 0.28 0.55 O.JO 1 . 30 
BUT 
age 35-49 0 . 2 1  0.41 0.17 0.33 0.18 0.78 
Working wife 0.18 0.37 0 . 15 0.29 0.16 0 . 69 
Children 0 . 13 0.25 0 . 10 0.20 0.11 0.47 
Not head, single 0.09 0.18 0 . 07 0.14 O.OB 0.34 
Higher education 0.B2 1.63 0 . 67 1.29 0.70 3 . 02 
tenure < 3 years 0.91 1 . 80 0 . 75 1 . 43 -- --
self-employed 0 . 14 0.27 0 . 11 0.22 -- --
REGIONAL DIPl'BRENTIALS 
House Pricss-
( 1 ) +0. 5235 1 . 07 2 . 11 O.BB 1.68 0.91 3.90 
(eg.Madrid 1989) 
{ H ) -O . 3842 0.41 0.94 0.39 0 . 1 5  0 . 40 1 .  76 
(eg.Arag6n 1989) 
Participation rate of 
change *100"1 . 3  0.41 0.82 0 . 34 0.65 0.35 1 . 53 
(eq. Cataluaa 1989) 
Unemployment rate - 0 . 1  0.35 0.69 0 . 28 0.55 0.11 1 . 85 
(eg. Andalucia 1989) 
Notee, 
1 .  Standard: head of household, age 25-34, wife not working, no children, primary education, employee private sector , 
tenure over three year., average region . 
""""" . 
� inter.eclU.te log-it .xs.18 tor tbe probability ot aiqration 
1 I 2 I 3 I • 
conatant -4.655(21. 78) -4.646(21-78) -4.646(21.77) -4.634(21.67) 
'9"" 16 to 24 0 .463 (3.13) 0.427 (2.87) 0.427 (2.87) 0 .423 (2.85) 
aged 2S to 34 0.539 (5.10) 0.525 (4.96) 0.525 (4.96) 0.518 (4.89) 
_/led 50 to 70 -1.042 (6.l9) -1.0lS (6.04) -1.015 (6.C4) -1.011 (6.00) 
primary education -0.438 (S.OO) -0.437 (4.99) -0.436 (4.99) -0.438 (5 .00) 
higher education 0.405 (3.17) 0.405 (3.17) 0 .405 (l.l? ) 0.438 (3.41) 
children -0.965 (9.52) -0.970 (9.58) -0.970 (9.58) -0.991 (9.'74) 
not head ot -1.277(11-58) -1.263(11-46) -1.263(11.46) -1.329(11.75) hou •• hold aingle (nhh.) 
:rrried with working -0.662 (5.02) -0.663 (5 .03 )  
-0.663 (5 .03) -0.654 (4.95) w ,. 
unemployed 0.040 (0.19) 0.631 (2.98) 0.631 (2.98) 0.625 (2.94) 
registered at INBK -- -1.503 (6.29) -1.499 (6.25) -1. 501 (6.03) 
tenure O!: 3 years -0.972 (9.89) -0.979 (9.94) -0.978 (9.94) -0.971 (9.85) 
employ_ 
.ector in public 
1.418 (8.31) 1.417 (8.33) 1.416 (8.33) 1.408 (8.25) 
employee in private 0.963 (6.15) .ector 
0.964 (6.18) 0.964 (6.18) 0.960 (6.14) 
agriculture -0.665 (3.09) -0.673 (3.13) -0.674 (3.13) -0.671 p.ll) 
indu.try -0.931 (6.22 ) -0.928 (6.20) -0.928 (6.20) -0.930 (6.21) 
.ervices -0.235 (1.93) -0.232 (1.91) -0.232 (1. 91) -0.232 (1.91) 
Unemploya:H!tnt -4.303 (4.98) -4.029 
differential 
C4.66) -3.966 (4.l0) -0.084 (0.06) 
un�E�em�r;�id -- -- -0.351 (0.16) 4.334 (1.80, 
· regi.tered -- -- -- -14.079(2.87, 
· higher education -- -- -- 3.686 (1.42) 
· children -- -- -- -5.468 (2.83, 
· nhho -- -- -- -9.360 (4.32, 
�:�gi&tU��e��I:l 0.110 C4.34) 0 .109 (4.33) 0.109 (4.33) 0.122 {4.50, 
Ufl:c;.r�r;h��owth - -- -- -0.101 (1.38) education 
��¥�:r��iI:l 0.933 (4.69) 0.904 (4. SS) 0.904 C4.54) 0.921 (4.64) 
!�1�:�e�nitl -- -- -- --
�n�e�:grid 
2. 115 C4.84) 2 .149 (4.92) 2 .149 (4.92) 2. 170 (4.96) 
As"ocia;aon of 
i�r-;g�ervia°b. response. 
concordant 71.5' 72.6' 72.6\ 72.7\ 
tied 15.3' 14.6\ 14.6\ 14.6\ 
- log likelihood 4032 .44 4008.44 4008.43 3992.15 
Noteal Aa for table 2 .  
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